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In 1993, the corporate bond primary market in Japan underwent a major change. The 
Financial System Reform Act allowed banks to enter the underwriting business by setting up 
securities subsidiaries.  This paper analyzes yield differentials between issues underwritten by 
bank subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses.  By estimating a regression model 
with correction for self-selection bias, we can distinguish between several hypotheses concerning 
the effect of bank underwriting of corporate bonds on their yields.  We show that investors 
discount corporate bonds underwritten by bank-owned subsidiaries because they suspect conflict 
of interest.  Bank-owned subsidiaries, on the other hand, try to avoid this conflict by 
underwriting bonds intended for institutional investors and bonds issued by firms with weak 
main bank ties.  While investors’ suspicions of conflict of interest may put bank-owned 
subsidiaries at a disadvantage with respect to incumbent security houses, this study suggests that 
an aggressive entry strategy on the part of bank-owned subsidiaries has offset the disadvantage 
so far.  In light of the recent repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, these findings will be of particular 








Recent passage of the Financial Modernization Bill by the U.S. Congress marks formally 
the end of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separated commercial banking, investment 
banking, and insurance.  Although we have already witnessed some evidence of consolidation 
and diversification in the financial industry over the last few years, this trend toward “universal 
banking” will undoubtedly accelerate in the near future. 
One controversy surrounding financial modernization is the concern that large, 
consolidated financial institutions will have access to too much information about client firms 
and consumers.  Specifically with respect to the issue of banks’ engaging in corporate bond 
underwriting—an activity traditionally prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act—some observers are 
concerned that commercial banks will use the private information they have about bond issuers 
to benefit themselves (i.e., conflict of interest between underwriter and investors).  On the other 
hand, some argue that banks in fact use their information to signal the quality of bonds to 
investors (i.e., certification).   
Examining data from the pre-Glass-Steagall era, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) found that 
investors well understood the potential conflict of interest and effectively forced banks to 
underwrite only high quality issues.  Puri (1996) also examined data from the pre-Glass-Steagall 
period.  She found that the conflict of interest effect was in fact completely dominated by the 
certification effect, and that investors were willing to pay even higher prices for bank-
underwritten securities. 
Another pre-Glass-Steagall-era study examined the relation between the involvement of 




probability of failure was actually lower for those banks that were actively involved in the 
securities business.  Hoshi (1996) found in his study of pre-war Japanese corporate finance that 
bank failures during both the financial depression in 1927 and the depression after Japan’s return 
to the gold standard (1930) were unrelated to their active involvement in the securities business. 
In 1987, the interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act was relaxed to allow some U.S. 
banks to set up securities subsidiaries (“Section 20 subsidiaries”).  Gande, Puri, Saunders, and 
Walter (1997) found significant certification effects by banks whose Section 20 subsidiaries were 
engaged in corporate bond underwriting.  More recent work by Gande, Puri, and Saunders 
(1999) has shown that bank entry into the corporate bond underwriting market has had pro-
competitive effects.   
This paper is the first to examine the evidence of bond underwriting by bank-owned 
security subsidiaries in Japan, which started in the mid 1990s.  Similar to studies by Puri (1996) 
and Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) for the United States, we analyze the yield 
differentials between straight corporate bonds underwritten by incumbent securities firms and 
those underwritten by bank-owned subsidiary securities firms in the Japanese market.   
An examination of the Japanese case should be useful in two regards.  First, since the 
Japanese main bank system operates on a tradition of close bank-firm ties (see for example, Aoki 
and Patrick, 1995), we would expect evidence of conflict of interest (or certification) to be 
stronger in Japan than in the United States.  If there is conflict of interest, rational investors will 
require higher yields on securities underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  And if the underwriter’s 
parent bank is the main bank of the issuing firm, this effect may be stronger.  For similar reasons, 




A second reason for our interest in the Japanese experience is that it permits an 
examination of the phenomenon of economic significance.  In comparison with their U.S. 
Section 20 counterparts, bank subsidiaries in Japan have penetrated the underwriting market with 
much greater speed and now operate as major market players.  With the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act and the decreased cost of consolidation in U.S. financial markets, bank-securities 
companies in the United States can be expected to underwrite more corporate securities.  In this 
regard, the Japanese experience in the corporate bond underwriting market can serve as an 
important indicator of the future of the U.S. market.   
This paper also shows importance of explicitly incorporating a correction for self-
selection bias in the regression analysis.  Since bond issuers can choose which underwriters to 
use, the ordinary least square (OLS) of the regressions of yield difference on firm characteristics 
and the underwriter choice variable would give us inconsistent estimates.  In order to correct for 
such a self-selection bias, we use a two-stage regression methodology, originally developed by 
Heckman (1979), Greene (1981) and Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1981) among others.  This 
methodology also allows us to test additional hypotheses about underwriter’s pricing policies, 
such as raising the yield because of distribution disadvantages the underwriter faces, or lowering 
the yield for the sake of attracting new business.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we stipulate four possible 
hypotheses for yield differences between bonds underwritten by bank-subsidiaries and those by 
traditional investment banks.  Section III describes the data used to test those hypotheses.  In 
section IV, we take a preliminary look at the data and summary statistics.  Section V describes 
the econometric method that enables us to distinguish the four hypotheses in section II.  Section 





II. Background and the Hypotheses 
 
Like the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States, Article 65 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1948 in Japan prohibited banks from underwriting securities. With the gradual 
deregulation of the Japanese financial system that started in the late 1970s, the separation 
between banking and securities came under increased scrutiny.  In an effort “to promote the 
healthy development of financial markets through effective and proper competition and to give 
incentives to financial institutions to better serve their clients through the introduction of a 
variety of new products” (Ministry of Finance, 1994), the Financial System Reform Act went 
into effect on April 1, 1993.  One of the major changes under the new law was the lowering of 
the traditional wall between banks and securities firms, allowing banks (securities firms) to set 
up their own security firm (trust bank) subsidiaries.  The first banks to receive licenses to 
establish security subsidiaries were the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan, and Norinchukin Bank.  These three banks established their subsidiaries on July 26, 1993.  
City banks, trust banks, and regional banks followed, with the last subsidiary opening its doors in 
April 1996 (see Table 1). 
During a short period of time, bank-owned security subsidiaries aggressively increased 
their share of the corporate bond underwriting business in Japan.  Table 2 shows the number and 
amount of domestic straight bond issues by Japanese corporations from the first quarter of 1994 
to the fourth quarter of 1997.  The table also shows the number and amount of bonds for which 
bank-owned subsidiaries were the leading underwriters.  Soon after November 1994, when all of 




lead-underwriting jumped to 34% in value and 42% in number (1st quarter of 1995).  Bank 
subsidiaries continued to increase their influence, and by the end of our sample period (4th 
quarter of 1997), partially aided by the major scandals at big securities houses, their share had 
reached 82% in value and 85% in number.1  Thus, in about four years from their initial 
establishment, bank subsidiary securities firms had become the dominant players in the Japanese 
corporate bond underwriting market.  
A comparison with underwriting by Section 20 subsidiaries in the United States reveals 
the economic significance of corporate bond issues and bank underwriting in Japan. In a sample 
period from January 1993 to March 1995, Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) report a total 
of 670 corporate bond issues (amounting to $120 billion) by the U.S. corporations, of which only 
80 ($8.6 billion) are underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  According to Gande, Puri, and Saunders 
(1999), the market share of bank underwriting of corporate bonds increased from 4.4% in 1991 
to 16.28% in 1996.  In Japan, in the four years from 1994 to 1997, there are a total of 898 
corporate bond issues (approximately $100 billion), of which 445 (approximately $41 billion) 
bonds were underwritten by bank subsidiaries. 
In 1998 and 1999, as a result of economic troubles at parent banks and intense 
competition in the underwriting business, many bank-owned subsidiaries were liquidated or 
acquired by other security firms.2  The number of bank-owned security subsidiaries declined 
from 19 in the beginning of 1998 to 10 by the summer of 1999.  The remaining subsidiaries, 
however, continue to be major players in the underwriting market.   
The remarkable growth of bank subsidiary securities firms in Japan may be less 
surprising when one considers the close relationship between Japanese banks and firms nurtured 




Reform Act of 1993, Japanese banks, playing the role of trustees for their customers, placed 
corporate bonds in the domestic market.  When Japanese corporations issued bonds abroad, 
Japanese banks often served as guarantors and sometimes co-underwrote bonds with Japanese 
securities houses.  As Campbell and Hamao (1995) have shown, the trustees of domestic bonds 
and guarantors of foreign bonds were most likely to be the main banks of corporations. 
The main bank relationship naturally extends to the relationship between bank-owned 
security subsidiaries and bank clients.  Thus, when a company uses a bank-owned subsidiary to 
underwrite its bonds, one may expect the company to use the securities subsidiary owned by its 
main bank.  Our data show, however, this was not necessarily the case, especially after late 1995.  
When a company used a bank subsidiary as the lead-underwriter, that subsidiary was owned by 
the company’s main bank in 62% of the cases.  If we focus only on those firms with a main bank 
that has a securities subsidiary, the proportion increases to 70%.  But, we also find a sharp 
decline in the proportion of main bank subsidiary underwriting in the total underwriting by bank 
subsidiaries.  In 1994, for instance, bank subsidiaries only underwrote bonds issued by the 
customers of their parent banks.  Until the end of 1995, the proportion of main bank underwriting 
remained above 80% (calculated in terms of the number of issues).  In the last quarter of 1995, 
the ratio dropped to around 50%, where it remained throughout 1996 and 1997.   In other words, 
bank-owned security subsidiaries began underwriting the bonds of corporations that do not have 
their parent banks as their main banks (or do not have any main bank). 
Thus, the growth of underwriting by bank-owned security subsidiaries appears to be 
expanding beyond the traditional boundaries of main bank ties.  This development would not 
have serious economic implications if it were just like underwriting by established securities 




subsidiaries may be different from underwriting by security houses.  For example, a bank-owned 
subsidiary may collude with the bank and underwrite bonds issued by a poorly performing 
customer, so that the customer can pay back its loans to the bank with proceeds from the bond 
issue.  In fact, the prevention of such conflict of interest was an important economic rationale 
behind the Glass-Steagall Act.  In the remainder of this section, we present four hypotheses that 
predict important differences between the bonds underwritten by bank-owned security 
subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses.  We will test these hypotheses in later 
sections using data from Japan.   
The first hypothesis is that of conflict of interest.  In making and monitoring loans, 
commercial banks acquire private information about a firm that is not available to general 
investors in the securities market.  Thus, if banks are allowed (maybe through subsidiaries) to 
underwrite corporate securities, a conflict of interest can develop.  As previously mentioned, 
banks can underwrite corporate bonds issued by a firm they privately know to be unsound and 
then require that firm to use the proceeds to repay loans, thus transferring their risk to general 
public investors. To compensate for this possible conflict of interest, investors should require 
higher returns for bonds underwritten by banks than those underwritten by security houses.  
Thus, the conflict of interest hypothesis implies higher yields for bonds underwritten by bank-
owned security subsidiaries.   
On the other hand, underwriters can certify the value of the new issue.  Having more 
information about a firm, banks would have greater ability to certify than do their counterpart 
securities firms.  Correct certification by underwriters would improve their own reputation, 
thereby encouraging banks to continue to do so.  Thus the certification hypothesis implies a 




Another possibility is that securities firms will have an advantage over newly established 
banking subsidiaries in placing corporate bonds due to their greater skills in bond pricing and 
distribution.  This would lower yields on bonds underwritten by existing securities firms 
compared to those underwritten by bank subsidiaries.3  This “distribution (dis)advantage” is our 
third hypothesis for yield differentials. 
Yet another possibility is that newly established bank subsidiaries have aggressively 
expanded their shares by offering very attractive bond pricing.  There were even rumors 
suggesting that bank subsidiaries have underwritten bonds at a loss (harakiri).  Even if they did 
not go as far as making a loss, as long as their pricing was more aggressive than the incumbent 
securities houses, we would find that bonds underwritten by bank subsidiaries will have lower 
yields.  This is our fourth hypothesis that we examine. 
To test a similar hypothesis of competitive behavior by Section 20 companies in the 
United States, Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) examined underwriter spreads, or differences in 
the underwriting fees that underwriters charge issuers.  In Japan, however, underwriting fees for 
corporate bond issues of the same maturity were fixed across underwriters until the beginning of 
1998 (see Nikkei Financial, February 3, 1998).  Therefore underwriters could only undercut the 
market by promising higher prices to the issuers.  Thus, we focus on the differences in the 
subscribers’ yields. 
 
III.  Data 
 
To test the above four hypotheses, we examine data for domestic corporate straight bond 




31, 1997.  The original data are collected from Nikkei NEEDS “Corporate Action” magnetic 
tapes, which record all changes in corporate financing through financial markets (new issues of 
debt, equity or convertible securities, retirement of securities, conversion of convertible 
securities, etc.).  We chose only domestic public issues because in this data set underwriters’ 
identities are not available for Euro and privately placed issues.  Only straight bonds are 
considered since (1) they have become a major financing tool for Japanese corporations during 
the time period we examine, and (2) we would like to have a direct comparison with traditional 
bank loans.  We also exclude from the analysis bonds issued by NTT and electricity power 
utilities.  The attributes we use in this data set are: date of issue, identity of issuers, industry 
code, issue amount, maturity, coupon rate, issue price, and lead underwriter of issues. 
We also use data on the Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) as a basis to compute yield 
spread at the time of the issue.  The JGB yield with a matching maturity to a new corporate bond 
issue is computed by interpolating yields of two bonds with the closest maturities.  For example, 
suppose a corporate bond is issued on May 20 with 4 years of maturity.  Then two JGBs are 
searched; one with a maturity just short of, but closest to 4 years (e.g., 3 years and 350 days) and 
another with a maturity just over, but closest to 4 years (e.g., 4 years and 10 days), as of May 20.  
The yield to maturity of these two JGBs are averaged and used as a benchmark for this corporate 
bond issue.  We only use the JGB yields with maturities up to 10 years, and hence exclude the 
“super-long” JGB with 20 years of maturity.  This is because super-long JGBs are issued only 
sporadically and the quality of yield data is often problematic.  The yield spread is defined as 
yield to maturity of corporate bond minus its benchmark JGB yield to maturity.  The JGB yield 




Additional data on characteristics of the issuing firms are obtained from NEEDS financial 
statement data and Hamao (1991) monthly stock returns data.  The items we use are: market 
value of outstanding equity, total debt, and total loan.  They are used to compute the size of the 
firm, market debt-to-capital (debt plus market value of equity) ratio, and bank loan-to-total debt 
ratio.  The data are as of the end of the most recent accounting year. 
Finally, data on the main bank relationship are taken from Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.  For 
each listed firm, the main bank is identified as the lender with the largest share, and the ratio of 
loans by the main bank to total debt is computed.  When a company has no bank loan 
outstanding, we interpret that as the company having no main bank. 
 
IV.  Preliminary Analysis and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A in Table 3 reports the means of the major variables in our database.  As 
discussed in the last section, the JGB yields used in calculating the spread are for bonds with 
maturity up to 10 years.  Consequently, we dropped from our sample issues with maturity longer 
than 10 years.  (There are 60 of them.)  For eleven cases, we could not calculate the loan-to-debt 
ratio of issuing firms since they do not have debt outstanding at the end of most recent 
accounting period.  In one case, the market value of equity was not available at the end of the 
most recent accounting period.  Sixteen issues with floating coupons were also dropped.  
Eliminating these cases leaves 810 issues out of the original 898 issues. 
The means for the entire sample of 810 are reported in the first column.  The second 
column reports the means for the cases where the lead underwriter is a bank subsidiary (401 




The table reveals several interesting differences between the issues underwritten by bank 
subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses.  First, the issue size is substantially (and 
statistically significantly) smaller for the issues underwritten by bank subsidiaries.  This is what 
we would expect from Table 2, which showed the share of bank subsidiaries to be larger when it 
is calculated using the number of issues.  Thus, compared with securities houses, bank 
subsidiaries seem to bring more small issues to the market. But, more direct measures of firm 
size, such as capitalization and total assets, do not show much difference between the issues 
underwritten by bank subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses. 
Second, the spread is slightly higher for issues underwritten by bank subsidiaries, and the 
difference is marginally significant.  The comparison, however, does not control for other factors 
that might influence the spread.  We examine the effects of underwriters’ identity on the spread 
in more detail below by estimating a regression model with a correction for self-selection bias.  
Finally, the companies that use bank subsidiaries for underwriting their bonds tend to have 
higher loan-to-debt ratios. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports distribution of maturity of corporate bonds.  Five years is the 
most commonly used maturity of bonds.  When we compare maturities of those issues 
underwritten by banks with the entire sample, we find a slightly higher concentration of 
maturities in five and six years for the bank underwritten issues. 
 
V. Econometric Method 
 
 To examine the effect of bank underwriting on the corporate bond yield, we estimate the 
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where y is the yield spread on corporate bonds, z is a 0-1 variable that takes 1 when the lead-
underwriter is a bank-owned security subsidiary and 0 otherwise, and X is a vector of the other 
variables that influence the yield.  The distribution of disturbance ε is assumed to be normal.  
The parameter α measures the effect of having bank-owned subsidiaries as the underwriter on 
the bond yield.  The vector of the coefficients on X is denoted by β. 
 We note that a decision to use a bank-owned security subsidiary as the lead underwriter is 
a result of a conscious calculation on the part of an issuing firm.  Thus, the value of z in (1) may 
reflect self-selection and may cause the parameter estimates to be inconsistent.  To correct for  
possible self-selection, we first consider the choice of underwriter explicitly.  Assume that there 
exists an unobservable factor z* that drives the choice of the underwriter.  We model z* as a 
function of a vector of variables W, which may have some elements in X.  A firm is assumed to 
choose a bank-owned security subsidiary as the underwriter when and only when z* is greater 
than zero.  Thus, our selection model is given by: 
 















where γ is a vector of coefficients on W, and u and ε have bivariate normal distribution with 










 Given the specification of the selection model, one can show that:4
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where φ() and Φ() are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function 
respectively of the standard normal distribution.  We can combine (4) and (5) to get an 
expression for E[ε|z]. 
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 To estimate the parameters in (1) consistently, we first estimate the probit model given by 
(2) and (3), and calculate h(z,W;γ) for each observation using the estimate for γ.  Let 
be such estimates.  Consistent estimates of α and β are obtained by estimating: )ˆ;,(ˆ γWzhh =
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by OLS.  The new disturbance term e is given by ε-E[ε|z] and hence uncorrelated with z.  The 
OLS estimate of hβ  gives a consistent estimate of ρσ. 
 Note that we can distinguish two ways that the yield on a corporate bond underwritten by 
a bank-owned subsidiary may differ from that on a similar bond underwritten by an independent 
security house.  First, the decision to use a bank-owned subsidiary as the lead-underwriter 
provides some new information that influences the yield.  This is captured by the correlation (ρ) 
between u and ε in this model.  The existence of this process can be examined by testing whether 
hβ  is zero or not.  Second, even when the decision to use a bank-owned subsidiary does not 
provide any new information, the yield may be influenced as long as α is not zero. 
 In Section 2, we identified four potential effects of bank underwriting on the yield of 




examined by looking at the estimate of hβ  in (9), because both effects result from some new 
information provided by the decision to use a bank-owned security subsidiary as the underwriter.  
In the conflict of interest case, bank underwriting suggests that the bank may be trying to dump 
poor quality bonds to investors.  If that is the case, bank underwriting that is not obvious from 
the observable variable (W), which is associated with high u in this model, is likely to increase 
the spread.  Thus, we would expect ρ to be positive and hence hβ  to be positive, too.  If there is 
a certification effect, new information revealed by bank underwriting tends to reduce the yield on 
the bond.  Thus, we would expect ρ and hence hβ  to be negative.  By looking at the estimate of 
hβ , then, we can examine which of the two effects is more important. 
 The last two effects that we discussed in Section 2, the distribution disadvantage and the 
aggressive entry strategy, would be observed even if the decision to use a bank-owned security 
subsidiary as the underwriter did not reveal any new information.  If the bank-owned security 
subsidiaries are at a disadvantage in distributing bonds to investors, and if the cost of this 
disadvantage is partially shouldered by the issuers, the yield on bonds underwritten by bank-
owned subsidiaries will be higher than the yield on bonds underwritten by incumbent securities 
houses.  This will hold even if the decision to use bank-owned subsidiaries as underwriters does 
not reveal any relevant information (i.e., ρ = 0).  Thus, we would expect to find a positive α.  If 
the bank-owned security subsidiaries offered aggressively high bond prices to increase their 
market shares quickly, then we would expect the yields on the bonds they underwrote to be 
lower even if the decision of bank underwriting itself does not reveal any new information.  In 
this case, we would expect a negative α. 
 Thus, correcting for the potential self-selection bias allows us to identify the two types of 




hypotheses discussed in Section 2.  Table 4 summarizes the above discussion and lists the major 
implications of the four hypotheses on the parameters in the regression (9). 
 Although the OLS estimates of (9) are consistent, their standard errors are not.  This is 
because (i) e is heteroskedastic and (ii) we use an estimated h instead of its true value.  
Following Greene (1981), we calculate a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the 
coefficients in (9) as follows.  First, using the coefficient estimates of the selection model, we 
can form an estimate for δ given by (8).  Let δˆ denote the sample average of the estimate.  Then, 
form estimates of σ and ρ as: 
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Let X* be a matrix that contains an observation for  as each row.  Let be a diagonal 
matrix of .  Then, a consistent estimate of covariance matrix of the OLS estimators in (9) can 
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where Q is given by: 
 





and V denotes a consistent estimate of the variance. ˆ
 
VI. Estimation Results 
 
 We first estimate a probit model that describes how a bond issue is underwritten by a 
bank-owned subsidiary rather than by a security house.  The model considers six factors that 
influence the identity of the bond underwriter.  The first factor is the size of issue.  Table 3 
suggests that bank-owned subsidiaries are more likely to underwrite smaller issues.  Thus, we 
include the issue size as an explanatory variable for the probit model.   
The next two factors are characteristics of the capital structure of the issuing firm.  The 
debt-capital ratio is measured as the book value of debt divided by the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt.  The loan-debt ratio is calculated by dividing the book value of bank 
loans by the book value of total debt.  We allow both of these variables to influence the choice 
between different types of underwriters.   
We also consider the extent of the relationship between the corporation and its main bank 
as another factor that may influence the choice of the lead-underwriter.  We measure the extent 
of relationship by the ratio of loans from the main bank to total bank loans.   
The maturity of issue is another factor that may influence the choice.  As we observed in 
Panel B of Table 3, bank-owned subsidiaries have a tendency to underwrite bonds with medium 
maturity (5 or 6 years).  The probit model takes this into account by including a dummy variable 




 Finally, we include a dummy variable that takes one for issues with a minimum face 
value greater than ¥100 million.  An issue with a minimum face value exceeding ¥100 million is 
usually considered to be bought primarily by institutional investors, and is exempt from 
designating a bond management company, which for reasons of investor protection the 
Commercial Code otherwise requires.  Since a bond management company is almost always a 
bank, it is conceivable that when a bank can collect those fees as a bond management company, 
it does not try hard to let its security subsidiary obtain the lead-underwriter position.  
Alternatively, bank-owned securities subsidiaries may in fact try to underwrite those bonds, 
because the institutional investors would be relatively more informed.  Compared with 
uninformed investors, the fear of conflict of interest may be less serious. 
 Table 5 shows the results of our probit estimation.  The first specification includes 30 
industry dummies.  Because a Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that all the 30 coefficients 
on industry dummies are equal, we drop the industry dummies in the second specification.  In 
both specifications, we include 15 quarterly dummy variables.  The coefficient estimates on both 
sets of dummy variables are not reported in the table.  The size of the issue enters the model 
significantly with a negative coefficient.  When the size of the issue is small, it is more likely to 
be underwritten by a bank subsidiary.  This result is consistent with the observation we made in 
Table 3.  The effect of debt to capital ratio is not statistically significant, although the point 
estimate of the coefficient suggests a company with high dependence on debt is more likely to 
use a bank-owned subsidiary for the lead-underwriter.  A similar finding is made for the loan to 
debt ratio.  A company with high dependence on bank loans is more likely to use a bank-owned 





The main bank loan to total loan ratio has a significant impact on the underwriting 
decision.  The coefficient estimate is negative, implying that an issuer that does not depend on 
the main bank so much in terms of bank loans is more likely to use bank subsidiaries for bond 
underwriting.  Thus, bank subsidiaries seem to have been targeting firms that have loosened their 
ties to main banks, rather than pursuing those firms with strong main bank ties.  This can also be 
interpreted as the result of an effort on the part of bank-owned subsidiaries to avoid possible 
conflict of interest.  Kroszner and Rajan (1994) uncovered a similar effort on the part of U.S.  
securities affiliates of commercial banks in pre Glass-Steagall United States.  These affiliates 
tended to underwrite securities issued by large and well-known firms and shied away from 
underwriting securities of small firms, where the conflict of interest would be more serious.   
The dummy variable for medium maturity (5 or 6 years) enters the model with a positive 
and significant coefficient, suggesting the bank-owned subsidiaries were more likely to 
underwrite bonds with medium maturities.  This is consistent with what we would expect from 
Panel B of Table 3. 
Finally the dummy variable for bonds with minimum face value exceeding ¥100 million 
enters the model with a positive sign.  The statistical significance is marginal in the first 
specification, but is reasonably high in the second specification.  This suggests that bank-owned 
security subsidiaries are more likely to underwrite bond issues aimed at institutional investors.  
Since institutional investors are probably more informed than are small individual investors, the 
result is again consistent with the idea that banks try to avoid the problem of conflict of interest. 
We use the estimation results of the probit model to form estimates of the h function 
defined in (6).  These estimates are employed to correct for a possible self-selection bias in the 




The regression model considers three variables on corporate characteristics that would influence 
the yield spread: the amount of total assets (in log), the debt to capital ratio, and the loan to debt 
ratio.  Two dummy variables are included to control for the effect of maturity on the spread.  The 
first dummy variable (maturity ≤ 5 years) takes value one if the maturity of the bond is relatively 
short (3, 4, or 5 years) and zero if the maturity is long (6, 7, 8, or 10 years).  We also include a 
dummy variable for bonds with 7 years of maturity since an anomaly in the JGB market during 
the sample period makes a 7 year JGB relatively cheap (higher yield) in comparison with the 
fitted term structure model.5  The model also includes 15 quarterly dummies to control for any 
time specific effects and 30 industry dummies to control for industry specific effects (coefficient 
estimates are not reported in the table). 
The last two variables in the regression relate to the effects of bank underwriting on yield 
spreads.  “Bank Subsidiary” is a dummy variable that takes one when the lead underwriter of the 
issue is a bank-owned security subsidiary.  As we discussed in Table 4, the coefficient estimate 
of this variable can be used to test the distribution advantage hypothesis and the aggressive entry 
strategy hypothesis.  The variable  is the estimate of the h function.  In the first specification, h  
is generated using the coefficient estimate from the probit model with industry dummies.  In the 
second specification, the probit estimation without industry dummies is used to estimate h.  As 
discussed in Table 4, we can test the conflict of interest hypothesis and the bank certification 
hypothesis by examining the coefficient on h . 
hˆ ˆ
ˆ
In both specifications, we find that size, measured by the log of total assets, is an 
important determinant of the yield spread.  A larger corporation enjoys lower spread.  The 
existence of debt, and especially bank debt, increases the spread, although the coefficient on the 




dummy suggests that the spread tends to be higher for bonds with relatively short maturity.  
Since the yield curve was upward sloping for the sample period, this implies that the yield curve 
for corporate bonds at the time of issue was flatter than that for government bonds.  The 
coefficient estimates on the 7 year maturity dummy confirm the existence of an anomaly in the 
JGB yield curve.  The yield on the 7 year JGB is abnormally high, which reduces the spread. 
The coefficient on h  is positive.  It is statistically significant in the second specification 
and significant at 5.3% level in the first specification.  This suggests that the disturbance in the 
selection model and the disturbance in the yield spread regression are positively correlated.  
Thus, the information revealed by the fact that the issue is underwritten by a bank subsidiary 
tends to increase the yield spread.  This result is consistent with the existence of conflict of 
interest. 
ˆ
The coefficient on the bank underwriting dummy is negative and statistically significant 
in both specifications.  This result suggests that an issue underwritten by a bank-owned 
subsidiary tends to have a lower spread.  The coefficient is significant not only in a statistical 
sense but also in an economic sense.  These results suggest bank underwriting tends to reduce the 
spread by 60 to 90 basis points.  Compared to the sample mean of the spread (34 basis points) 
and the sample standard deviation (36 basis points), this is a huge effect.  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis of aggressive entry strategy on the part of bank-owned security subsidiaries. 
Thus, we find evidence that conflict of interest tends to increase the yield spread for 
issues underwritten by bank-owned subsidiaries, and aggressive entry strategy tends to reduce 
the yield spread.  Since these two effects tend to offset each other, a simple OLS estimation of 
the yield regression is not likely to provide conclusive evidence for either hypothesis.  In an 




small effect of bank underwriting on corporate bond yields.  Controlling for the possible self-








This paper investigates a major change in corporate financing in Japan.  Following 
legislative reform in 1993, the corporate bond market in Japan expanded dramatically.  At the 
same time, newly established bank-owned securities houses began underwriting a very high 
proportion of these corporate bond issues.  
We analyze the yields on corporate bonds at the time of issue to look for evidence of (1) 
conflict of interest, (2) bank certification, (3) distribution advantage, or (4) aggressive entry 
strategy by bank-owned security subsidiaries.   Our econometric specification corrects for 
possible self-selection bias and enables us to distinguish among the above four hypotheses.  We 
find that bank subsidiaries have been cultivating new clients with weakening main bank ties, 
rather than serving firms for which the parent banks are the main banks.  We also find that bank 
subsidiaries focus on bond issues aimed mainly at institutional investors.  We find evidence for 
both conflict of interest and aggressive entry strategy. 
In conclusion, investors discount the corporate bonds underwritten by bank-owned 




other hand, try to avoid such conflict of interest by underwriting bonds intended for institutional 
investors and bonds issued by firms that do not have a main bank relationship with their parent 
banks, as our probit estimation suggests.  These findings are similar to the results obtained by 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994) for pre-Glass-Steagall United States.   Investors’ suspicions of 
conflict of interest put bank-owned subsidiaries at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the incumbent 
security houses.  Our study suggests that the bank-owned subsidiaries successfully increased 
their shares in the underwriting market despite this disadvantage by pursuing the aggressive 
entry strategy of promising higher issue prices than security houses do.  However, the recent exit 
of many security subsidiaries suggests that such an aggressive strategy is not likely to be 
sustainable.  It remains to be seen whether bank subsidiaries can build a new advantage to offset 






                                                          
1The share of lead-underwriting of bank subsidiary securities firms is larger when it 
is calculated for number than when calculated for value.  This implies that bank 
subsidiaries tend to be the lead-underwriter for smaller issues. 
 
2For problems in the Japanese banking sector in the late 1990s, see, for example, 
Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) and Hoshi and Patrick (2000). 
 
3For certain investors, however, one might argue that bank subsidiaries have a 
distribution advantage over securities firms.  For example, many regional banks in 
Japan maintain close relationships with some city banks since city banks are often 
large shareholders of regional banks.  If regional banks, rather than individual 
investors, are dominant buyers of corporate bonds, bank subsidiaries have a 
distribution advantage over existing securities firms.  Unfortunately, we cannot find 
detailed data on distribution channels of corporate bonds and cannot examine how 
likely this case may be. 
 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
5Because of accounting and tax reasons, investors in the JGB market use futures as a 
hedging tool, which makes the futures relatively inexpensive.  Since 7 year JGB is 
usually the cheapest to deliver against JGB futures contract with delivery options, 





TABLE 1. Bank Subsidiary Securities Firms 
 








LTCB Securities (Acquired by Warburg DR 




Sumitomo Trust Securities 
Mitsubishi Trust Securities (Closed in July 





Yasuda Trust Securities (Liquidated in March 
1998) 




Sumitomo Capital Securities (Acquired by 





BOT Securities  
Mitsubishi Diamond Securities 
(BOT Securities and Mitsubishi Diamond 
Securities merged to become Tokyo-Mitsubishi 




Tokai International Securities 
 
May 1995 
Mitsui Trust Securities (Liquidated in March 
1999) 










Yokohama City Securities (Liquidated in March 
1999) 
 
Source: Kin’yu Business, March 1997, p. 92, Ministry of Finance Securities Bureau Annual Report, 1997, Kin’yu 










Number of Issues 
 
Amount of Issues (Billion Yen) 
Quarter Total Bank Subsidiary 
Underwritten 
Total Bank Subsidiary 
Underwritten 
94:1 11 1 270 20 
94:2 18 1 520 10 
94:3 12 3 250 30 
94:4 11 0 275 0 
95:1 33 14 532 183 
95:2 30 8 580 100 
95:3 65 25 1,010 316 
95:4 71 29 983 383 
96:1 58 27 1,200 320 
96:2 65 33 829 375 
96:3 84 46 1,075 522 
96:4 88 43 1,171 538 
97:1 71 38 880 400 
97:2 108 55 1,590 782 
97:3 98 58 1,178 635 
97:4 75 64 955 783 
Total 898 445 13,300 5,396 
 
 




TABLE 3. Characteristics of Bonds Underwritten by Bank Subsidiaries:  
February 25, 1994 - December 31, 1997 
 
 
PANEL A  Cross-sectional means 
 
 Entire Sample Bank Underwriting 
Number of Observations 810 401 
Amount of Issue (Billion 
Yen) 
14.505 12.202*** 






















PANEL B  Distribution of maturity 
 
 














3 32 3.95 11 2.74 
4 99 12.22 43 10.72 
5 236 29.14 128 31.92 
6 157 19.38 91 22.69 
7 173 21.36 77 19.20 
8 16 1.98 4 1.00 
9 1 0.12 1 0.25 
10 96 11.85 46 11.47 
Total 810 100.00 401 100.00 
 
 
Note: Panel A reports cross-sectional means of various characteristics.   Yield Spread is the difference 
between corporate bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB yield.  (See text for the exact computation 
of JGB portfolio yield.)  Debt/Capital (Market) is book debt (interest bearing liabilities) divided by 




using book value of loan and debt.  Market Capitalization is number of shares outstanding times price per 
share.  Total Assets is the size of balance sheet (in book).  A *, **, and *** indicate significant 
differences from their complements at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Panel B reports distribution 












1. Conflict of Interest 
hβ  > 0 
2. Certification hβ  < 0 
3. Distribution Disadvantage α > 0 






























































Minimum Face Value 













Note: The table reports coefficients estimate from probit estimation.  The dependent variable is Bank 
Subsidiary which is a dummy variable that takes value one when the bond is underwritten by bank 
subsidiaries and zero otherwise.  Issue Size is the amount of bond issues.  Debt/Capital (Market) is book 




and Main Bank Loan/Total Loan are computed using book value of loan and debt.  Main Bank 
Loan/Total Loan is a ratio of loans from the main bank to total loans.  “Maturity = 5 or 6 years” takes one 
only for the issues with maturity of 5 or 6 years.  “Minimum Face Value ≥ 100 million yen” takes one 
when the minimum face value of the bond issue exceeds 100 million yen, which allows the issuing firm to 
have no bond management company.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Both specifications include 
15 quarterly time dummies, whose coefficient estimates are not reported.  The first specification includes 




 TABLE 6. Regressions of Yield Spread 



















































































Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from regression of yield spread (the difference between 
corporate bond yield at issue and corresponding JGB yield) on various firm and bond characteristics 
correcting for self-selection bias using the probit estimation in Table 5.  The specification also includes 15 
quarterly time dummies and 30 industry dummies, whose coefficients are not reported.  Total Assets is 
the size of balance sheet (in book).  Debt/Capital (Market) is book debt (interest bearing liabilities) 
divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt.  Loan/Debt is computed using book value of 
loan and debt.  Maturity≤ 5 years is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the maturity of the 
corporate bond is relatively short (3, 4, or 5 years) and zero if the maturity is long (6, 7, 8, or 10 years).  
Maturity = 7 years is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the maturity of the corporate bond is 7 
years and zero otherwise.  Bank Subsidiary is a dummy variable that takes value one when the bond is 
underwritten by a bank subsidiary and zero otherwise. h is the estimate of h defined in (6).  Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics.  The two models differ in the specifications of  the selection model used to 
generateh .  The first model uses the specification with industry dummies and the second model uses the 
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